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Monitoring of Corporate Groups by
Independent Directors
A. C. Pritchard*

Abstract
Both the United States and Korea have reformed their corporate governance in recent years
to put increasing responsibilities on independent directors. Independent directors have been
found to be an important force protecting the interests ofshareholders when it comes time to make
certain highly salient decisions, such as firing a CEO or selling the company. This article
compares the role of independent directors in the US and Korean systems. I argue that the US
may have placed regulatory burdens on independent directors that they are unlikely to be able to
satisfy, given their part-time status. By contrast, in the chaebol system of Korea, independent
directors may have a critical role to play in limiting self dealing by controlling shareholders.
Given the dominance of these controlling shareholders in the Korean economy, independent
directors will need strong backing to be effective in protecting the interests ofpublic shareholders.

Independent directors have become a popular "cure-all" in the United
States for whatever the latest malady ailing the modem corporation happens
to be. Whenever a corporation has found its way into the headlines as the .
subject of the scandal

du jour,

it is overwhelmingly the case that it is the

managers who are caught with their fingers in the till, having manipulated the
numbers, rolling the dice with the shareholders' money, or otherwise abusing
the trust of shareholders and other corporate constituencies. They are, after all,
the ones in charge of the day-to-day operations of the company. All too
frequently the managers, who have charged some outrageous perk to the
corporation's bill, or who have relabeled an expense as a capital expenditure,
are at the very top levels of the corporate hierarchy, perhaps even serving on

•
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the board. Immunity from greed, fear, and other weaknesses of character are
apparently not required to advance to the top of the corporate hierarchy.
It is the venality at the very top that most offends. Given the lofty levels of
compensation that CEOs in the United States typically receive, it

is

hard for

the average person (or more importantly, the average politician) to understand
the desire for further aggrandizement and reluctance to accept responsibility
for poor performance. One suspects that sense of outrage at the abuse of trust

is mirrored, and perhaps magnified, inside the boardrooms of the corporations
caught up in the wrongdoing. The directors who have placed their confidence,
and to some extent their reputations, in the hands of the CEO (who generally
will also serve as chairman of the board) are likely to feel a sense of betrayal as
well as outrage. The outside directors are probably not the last to know, but
they may take the most personal offense at the abuse.
How natural, then,

is the

instinct of policymakers confronted by corporate

wrongdoing to want to harness that sense of betrayal and outrage inside the
boardroom to make better citizens out of corporations and their officers. If
onJy we could shift power from the inside directors to the outside directors, all
would be well. The insiders, most offensively the CEO/Chair, may have been
complicit in the wrongdoing. But as for the outside directors, generally the
worst that can be said is that they did not know of the accounting shenanigans
or outsized bet. Perhaps shifting power to the latter, relatively innocent group,
·

we could thwart the wrongdoing before it even gets started, or at least root it
out before it begins to snowball into a major scandal. Conflict of interest

is the

problem, goes the story, so shifting authority to individuals whose judgment

is

unclouded by conflict will greatly reduce the embarrassing problems that

keep appearing in the headlines. Agency costs will be kept in check by
recruiting faithful agents as independent directors to monitor the insiders;
politicians and bureaucrats will avoid the awkward questions that inevitably
arise out of corporate scandal: "Why didn't you catch this sooner? Why
wasn't there a law to prevent this? What are you going to do to help these
investors who have lost all this money?"
The American faith in independent directors appears to have attracted
adherents globally - the long-term trend has been toward greater director
independence around the world. I will focus here, however, on two countries:
Korea and the United States. Both countries have turned to corporate
governance reform in the wake of crises. For Korea, the impetus was an
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economy-wide financial crisis that led to the intervention of the IMF in 1998.
Weaknesses of corporate governance were widely perceived as exacerbating
the financial shock to the Korean economy.1l
In this regard, the recent Korean experience echoed the American
experience with the market crash of October 1929, which was popularly
blamed for the subsequent widespread economic hardship that accompanied
the Great Depression. That episode led to the first federal securities laws in the
United States, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Those laws created the essential framework of the securities regime that
still governs in the U.S. In adopting those laws, however, the 1930's Congress
generally avoided wholesale incursions into the internal governance of
corporations, leaving that area generally for the states (with the limited
exception of disclosure relating to proxies). For the United States, the impetus
to corporate governance reform was the collapse of high-tech bubble, which
saw the tech-laden Nasdaq index plunge from nearly 5000 to 2000 in a year's
time.2l That collapse was accompanied by a salient scandal which fueled the
drive to reform. A series of high-profile accounting imbroglios (e.g., Emon,
Worldcom, Healthsouth, etc.), reflected any number of violations of existing
disclosure and anti-fraud requirements. As a result, the U.S. has witnessed a
number of criminal indictments and convictions for those disclosure
violations. Prosecution, however, was not deemed a sufficient response
(except perhaps by those indicted), so the accounting scandals have also
produced a number of governance reforms which apply to the guilty and
innocent alike. None of these reforms seem to have helped with the next crisis,
which stemmed from inadequate risk management, perhaps fueled by poorly
structured incentive compensation that rewarded executives of financial
institutions for placing enormous wagers on the direction of the housing
market.
Korea is further along from its motivating financial crisis. It has made great
strides during the intervening period in bringing its corporate governance
requirements up to international standards. Korea, infected like other

1) Hwa-Jin Kirn, Living with tlie IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation
of Financial Inst itutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. lNTL L. 61, 69 (1999).
2) The Nasdaq closed at 5,048.62 on March 10, 2000 and 1,923.38 on March 12, 2001, available
athttp://finance.yahoo.com.
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countries by the crisis in the U.S., must now face the question of whether it has
renewed its appetite for governance reform. Are further reforms needed? If
the answer is yes, does Korea have the political will to finish the job of
reforming its governance standards? Has Korea done enough to prevent the
fraud next time?
The United States by contrast, already boasted governance standards arising from a combination of state corporate law, exchange listing standards,
and best practices - that were among the most stringent in the world when it
faced its spate of the accounting scandals. Nonetheless, those governance
controls proved inadequate to prevent the sort of attention-getting frauds that
typically lead to corporate and securities fraud reform. The regulatory
backlash in the United States has led to the enactment of best practices as a
matter of federal law in the hope that doing so will help prevent fraud in the
future. Were those toughened standards needed, or were they overkill? Will
the United States' rigorous new standards prevent the fraud next time?
Obviously these two countries' reform drives have significantly raised
governance standards in both countries. More interesting, perhaps, is the fact
that the gap between the two has narrowed. Korean governance standards at least on paper - have many similarities to the standards now in place in
the United States. This facial similarity between the governance regimes in the
two countries overlooks one critical fact - the corporate environment varies
dramatically between Korea and the United States. Although the Korean
economy continues to be dominated by the
companies, the American economy

chaebol

groups of affiliated

is dominated by publicly-held companies

with widely dispersed shareholders. One question raised by Korea's move to
upgrade to international best practices is whether the practices appropriate for
a country like the United States, which has very few controlling shareholders,
can be translated into Korea's complex web of corporate groups. What
implication does this wide divergence in the two countries' corporate environ
ments have for determining the appropriate standards for corporate
governance? Most importantly for purpose of looking at the role of outside
directors, does independence have the same meaning and purpose in the
context of a corporate group? Does the notion of independence need to be
adjusted to fit into a group context? Should directors' independence be
measured with respect to the group as a whole, or only with respect to the
individual affiliated company within the group?
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In Parts

1

and

2

of this paper, I discuss the current state of corporate

governance in Korea and the United States and the recent changes to the two
regimes. In Part

3, I compare the very different governance problems faced in

those two countries and analyze whether the independent director is the
answer to the p r oblems faced in either c ountry. I conclude that t he
independent director is unlikely to eliminate fraud and self-dealing from the
American capital markets, as it proponents may have hoped. I also conclude,
however, that the use of independent directors, if properly bolstered by other
governance measures, could help mitigate the problems fostered by the

chaebol system in Korea.

Part 1: Corporate Governance in Korea
1.

The Dominance of the Chaebol
The defining characteristic of corporate governance in Korea is the

predominance of

chaebols, a group of affiliated firms

,

which although they are

legally independent, are nonetheless tied together by cross shareholdings.3l
The group is commonly dominated by a controlling shareholder or family.
Although common shares carry one vote per share in Korea (dual class shares
are prohibited for now4l), the strategic use of cross ownership results in the
controlling shareholder exercising voting power over the affiliated companies
substantially greater than the controller's economic rights. Kim, Lim and Sung
report a startling gap of median voting rights of
shareholders of

chaebol firms

,

but only

74.59 percent for controlling

12.95 percent median cash flow rights

for those shareholders.5l

3) Cross shareholding is not permitted between two firms, but this restriction is readily
circumvented through the use of three or more firms. Sea Jin Chang, Ownership Structure,
Exprop riation, and Performance of Group-Affiliated Companies in Korea, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 238, 238
(2003).
4) SANGBEOP [KOREAN COMMEROAL CODE] art. 369-1. The Ministry of Justice has drafted
legislation that would allow dual-class stock.
5) Woochan Kirn et al., What Determines the Ownership S tructure of Business Conglomerates ?:
On the Cash Flow Rights of Korea's Chaebol, ECG!
FINANCE WORKING PAPER No. 51/2004; KOi
Sc:HooL OF Pus Poucv & MANAGEMENT PAPER No. 04-20 (2004), at 22, available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=594741.
-

6 I Journal of Korean Law

Vol. 9: 1

In part to maintain this control, chaebol firms rely heavily on debt.6> Indeed,
this is the principal benefit afforded by affiliation with the chaebol group:
affiliated

firms

have greater access to financing than non-chaebol firms, the

result of cross-debt guarantees among chaebol member

firms.7l Moreover,

the

importance of the chaebol to the Korean economy means that they were
historically "too big to fail," enjoying the implicit guarantee of a bailout from
the government.8> That guarantee now appears to have been withdrawn, as
evidenced by the demise of the Daewoo group. Perhaps the recently enacted
prohibition of loans and guarantees to specially-related persons will put
pressure on the chaebol to reduce their debt levels.9> The available evidence
suggests that substantial improvement has been made already, with the debt
load of the chaebol substantially reduced from where it stood at the time of the
IMF crisis.10>

2.

Evidence on the Effect on Minority Shareholders
Unfortunately, the benefits afforded by greater access to debt carries with

it substantial costs for equity holders. The "separation of ownership and
control" enjoyed by the controlling shareholders of the chaebol has important
implications for minority shareholders in Korean firms. Although this
separation of cash flow rights from control rights may reduce the cost of debt
(perhaps because it aligns the interests of default-averse creditors with the
interests of under-diversified controlling shareholders), it may also leave

6) Jae-Seung Baek et al., Corporate Governance and Finn Value: Evidence from the Korean
Financial Crisis, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 265, 267 (2004) (the average debt to total assets ratio in the top 30
chaebol firms was 77.18% in 1993-1998).
7) Hyun-Han Shin & Young S. Park, F inancing Constraints and Internal Capital Markets :
Evidence from Korean 'Chaebols', 5 J. CoRP. FIN. 169, 172-73, 190 (1999).
8) Curtis J. Milhaupt, Privatization and Corporate Governance in a Unified Korea, 26 J. CoRP. L.
199, 207 (2000).
9) Cross-debt guarantees of chaebol group companies are tightly regulated by law.
DOKJEOMGYUJE MIT GoNGJEONGGEORAE E GwANHAN BEOPNYUL (KOREAN MONOPOLY REGULATION AND

FAIR TRADE Acr], art. 10-2. I am indebted to Joon Park for this point.
10) According to the analysis of the Financial Supervisory Service, the largest five chaebol
groups reduced their average total liabilities-to-equity ratio from 352% (December 31, 1998) to
125% (December 31, 2002); other chaebol groups reduced their average ratio from 427%
(December 31, 1998) to 172% (December 31, 2002).

Monitoring of Corporate Groups by Independent Directors I 7

No. I: 2009

minority shareholders vulnerable to expropriation by controlling shareholders.
The directors charged with protecting those minority shareholders are scant
protection:

"chaebol

affiliates' boards of directors are generally filled with
11
insiders and friends of chaebol families." ) Thus, the discretion of the

controlling shareholder is largely unchecked by the formal authority
supposedly held by the board.
There is considerable evidence of that controlling shareholders use that
discretion to appropriate wealth from the minority. For example, minority
shareholders in

chaebol

firms typically lose out when the firm makes an
12
acquisition, but the controlling shareholder benefits. ) Controlling shareholders
also appear to manipulate their ownership interests in group firms to
concentrate their economic rights in the most profitable members of the
13
group. ) Conversely, controlling shareholders may reduce their equity
exposure in group members firms that have provided debt guarantees to
14
more risky firms within the group. ) So the greater access to debt that chaebol

firms enjoy may again come at the expense of minority shareholders.
This divergence between control and economic rights may also manifest
itself in diminished profitability. Controlling shareholders in

chaebol

groups

may be more concerned with avoiding losses to their under-diversified wealth
than they are with maximizing the profits of the firms affiliated with the
group. Minority shareholders, b y contrast, are more likely t o be fully
diversified (and therefore effectively risk-neutral) and less likely to have
equity holding in each of the members of the group. There is evidence that the
ownership structure of the
shows that

chaebol

may hurt profitability. For example, Joh

chaebol firms

experienced lower operating profits during the pre
15)
crisis period. Monitoring by the controlling shareholder appears to promote
the interests of the group as a whole, not the firm for which the individual

works. So top executive turnover in

chaebol firms

appears to be unrelated to

11) Chang, supra note 3, at 241.
12) Kee-Hong Bae et al., Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business
Groups, 57 J. FIN. 2695, 2737 (2002).
13) Kim et al., s upra note 5, at 30; Chang, supra note 3, at 250.
14) Chang, supra note 3, at. 242.
15) Sung Wook Joh, Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence from Korea before the
Economic Crisis, 68 J. FIN. EcON. 2B7, 318-19 (2003); Terry L. Campbell & Phyllis Y. Keys, Corporate
Governance in South Korea: The Chaebol Experience, 8 J. CoRP. FIN. 373, 389 (2002).
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firm-level performance, whereas it is significantly related for non-chaebol
firms.16) In addition, executive compensation correlates with stock-market
returns and return on assets for non-chaebol firms, but there is no significant
relation between these performance measures and executive compensation for
chaebol firms, despite the fact that chaebol firms pay their executives more.17)
Not surprisingly, the stock market appears to recognize this risk of abuse
by the controlling shareholders of chaebol firms: Baek, Kang & Park find that
firms in which the controlling shareholders' voting rights exceed his economic
rights had significantly lower returns during Korea's financial crisis.18l By
contrast, firms with the largest non-managerial blockholder concentration
experience significantly greater stock returns during the crisis.19) These
findings suggest that concentrated ownership is not the problem; it is the
separation of control from cash flow entitlements. In addition, transparency
helps mitigate the problem; firms with cross-listed ADRs (thereby subject to
more stringent disclosure regimes) and firms with substantial foreign
institutional investment also enjoyed significantly less negative returns.20l
Monitoring of management by large investors - without the risk of
expropriation by the controlling shareholder - benefits all of the investors.
3.

Reforming the Chaebols

Reforming the corporate governance of the chaebols to discourage
misappropriation from minority shareholders has been a principal focus of the
government since the financial crisis of 1997-1998. The IMF and World Bank
identified weak corporate governance as an important cause of the crisis.21l

16) Campbell & Keys, supra note 15, at 390.
17) Takao Kato, Woochan Kirn & Ju Ho Lee, Executive Compensation, Finn Perfonnance and
Chaebols in Korea: Evidencefrom New Panel Data, 15 PAOFJC-BASIN FIN. J. 36 (2007).
18) Baek et al., supra note 6, at 310. Interestingly, the lower stock market returns of the
chaebol firms were not matched by lower accounting profitability during the crisis
chaebol
firms had greater profits (although the difference is not statistically sigrrificant) than their non
chaebol counterparts. Id. at 307.
19) Id. at 302.
20) Id. This fact is noteworthy in light of the fact that the flight of foreign capital played an
important role in exacerbating the effects of the financial crisis. Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 295,
297.
21) Joongi Kim, Recent Amendments to the Korean Commercial Code and Their Effects on
-
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Prior to these reforms,
Principal shareholders commanded all facets of corporate affairs,
including board decisions, the selection of directors or auditors, and
shareholder meetings. Principal shareholders single-handedly
appointed directors and auditors. Candidates were selected from
company employees, with one of the most important criteria being
personal loyalty to the principal shareholders.22l
Now, directors owe an explicit fiduciary duty to the corporation.23) In
addition, thresholds have been lowered for the bringing of derivative suits
and removing directors.24) The former change has resulted in a significant
increase in the number of derivative actions.25l
Large

firms (i.e., those

with assets greater than

2

trillion won) are singled

out for especially stringent corporate governance requirements. Large

firms

must draw at least half of their directors from outside the firm, have an audit
committee with at least two-thirds outside directors, and have a nominating
committee for outside directors.26) Chaebol firms have also received special
attention. Principal shareholders who act as de facto directors or otherwise
influence company management now owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation,
whether or not they serve formally as directors.27) Moreover, conflict of
interest transactions involving the firms in the groups with more than

5

trillion of total assets must be approved by the board of directors.28l There is
evidence that a similar provision adopted by the

SK

Group in its articles of

incorporation has been effective in preventing at least some overreaching by
the controlling shareholder.29) It is worth noting that the provision in question
may have been adopted as a result of pressure from foreign investors.30)

International Competition, 21 U. PA. J. !NTL ECON. L. 273, 275(2000).
22) Id. at 279-80.
23) KoREAN CoMMEROAL CODE, art. 382-3.
24) Id., art. 385 & 403 .
25) Kirn, supra note 21, at 295.
26) KoREAN CoMMEROAL CoDE, art. 542-8 & 542-1.
27) Id., art. 401-2.
28) KOREAN MONOPOLY REGULATION AND FAIR TRADE Acr, art. 11-2.
29) Kirn, supra note 21, at 325.
30) Id., at 324-25.
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These requirements appear to have had some effect, as

I

chaebol firms do not

have significantly worse governance than other Korean firms.31l There is
evidence that improvements in corporate governance have a real payoff Black, Jang, and Kim find that better corporate governance correlates with
significantly greater market valuation.32l For example, having a majority of
outside directors correlates with a roughly

40% greater share price.33l

To summarize, the main challenge facing the Korean system of corporate
governance

is

the predominance of the

chaebol

system. Korea has made great

strides over the last few years to try and bolster the protections afforded to
minority shareholders, but more must be done. I will tum to that topic in Part

3.

Part 2: Corporate Governance in the United States
1.

Dispersed Public Ownership
The pattern of corporate ownership in the United States differs substantially

from the one found in Korea. Controlling shareholders, while not unheard of,
are the exception rather than the rule. The typical ownership pattern in the
United States

is one of

dispersed public ownership, with no single shareholder

holding more than a small percentage of the company's shares. The need for
diversification and certain regulatory restrictions ensure that even institutional
investors will not ordinarily hold more than a small bloc of shares in any one
company. Moreover, cross-ownership

is relatively

rare. American companies

own shares in other companies, but they are typically a joint venture between
companies. More typically, a parent corporation will own

100%

of the shares

of a subsidiary, essentially obviating conflict of interest concerns, or different
businesses within a corporation will simply be operated as separate operating
divisions, without the formality of separate incorporation. (The downside of

31) Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kirn, Predicting F irms ' Corpora te Governance
Owices: Evidence from Korea, 12 J. CoRP. FIN. 660, 677 (2006).
32) Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kirn, Does Corporate Governance Predict F irms
Market Values ? Evidencefrom Korea, 22 J. L. EcoN. & ORc. 366 (2006).
33) Id.
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the latter arrangement, of course, is that all of the company's assets will be
placed at risk if one of the operating divisions sustains liabilities that it cannot
satisfy on its own.)
In this system of dispersed public ownership, the principal concern for
abuse of power by those in control is. not the risk posed by controlling
shareholders, but rather, the potential for overreaching by managers. Given
the dispersion of ownership, the voting mechanism will only be a weak check
on managerial abuse and incompetence. Managers (particularly CEOs) in
practice have a great deal of say over who will be named to the company's
board, so the ability of the shareholders to affect the company's direction
through their power to elect directors will be diffuse at best. Recognizing these
weaknesses in direct accountability to widely dispersed shareholders, the
corporate governance regime in the United States aims to protect the interests
of largely powerless shareholders from overreaching by m anagers.
Controlling shareholders are a concern, but a secondary one. The principal
role of independent directors in the corporate regime of the United States is to
restrain the CEO and other managers.

2.

Evidence on the Effect of Independent Directors
What does the available evidence from the United States show about the

success of independent directors in restraining managers? Most notably, on
the subject presumably of greatest interest to shareholders, there is no
evidence to show that more independent boards correlate with better firm
performance.34) So shareholders cannot rely on independent directors to
bolster the bottom line. This should hardly be surprising

-

if outside directors

were a magic elixir, somehow boosting corporate performance, we would
hardly need governance mandates to encourage greater board independence.
Companies would bring more independent directors on board purely out of
self-interest.
Independent directors do appear to have an effect, however, at certain
critical junctures for the corporation. Those junctures arise when the board is

34) Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long
Tenn Finn Perfonnance, 27 J. CoRP. L. 231, 259 (2001).
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asked to make certain high stakes decisions. Being an outside director has
historically been a part-time job, but at times it can capture the director's full
time attention. More independent boards are more likely to replace the

CEO

after a period of poor performance.35> Tilis finding suggests that independent
directors take this paramount monitoring task seriously. Turning to other
salient situations likely to capture the focus of independent directors, more
independent boards generally extract higher takeover premia in takeovers. 36)
Companies adopting "poison pill" shareholder rights plan experience a
positive stock price reaction if their board is majority independent, but a
negative reaction otherwise.37> What explains these findings relating to
takeovers? Perhaps more independent boards limit the ability of target
company managers to extract side payments from potential acquirers, which
the pill may facilitate. On the other side of the fence, acquiring companies
announcing takeovers experience less of a drop in their stock price if they have
a majority of independent directors.38> Independent directors may check
excessive managerial optimism and a penchant for empire building.
These findings that independent directors guide salient decisions are
promising. The evidence on whether more independent directors contribute
to more accurate financial reporting, however, is mixed. On the one hand,
board independence does not appear to have any significant effect on a
company's exposure to securities fraud class actions, one of the principal
unfortunate consequences stemming from inaccurate financial reporting in
the United States.39> On the other, there is evidence that weak governance,
including a lack of board independence, is associated with enforcement
actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission.40> This finding is

35) Michael S. Weisbach, O utside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 431, 458 (1988).
36) James F. Cotter et al., Do Independent Directors En/Janee Target S/Jare/Jolder Wealth During
Tender Offers?, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 216 (1997).
37) James A. Brickley et al., Outside Directors and t/Je Adop tion of Poison Pills, 35 J. FIN. ECON.
371, 388 (1994).
38) John W. Byrd & Kent A. Hickman, Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from
Tender Offer Bids, 32 J. FIN. EcoN. 195, 219 (1992).
39) Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do t/Je Merits Matter More? The Impact of t/Je Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 23 J. L. ECON. & 0RG. 627, 642 n.14 (2007).
40) Patricia M. Dechow et al., Causes and Cansequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis
of Firms S ubject to Enforcemen t Actions by t/Je S EC, 13 CoNTEMP. Acer. RFS. 1, 21-22 (1996); Mark S.
Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of t/Je Relation Between t/Je Board of Direc tor Composition and
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confirmed in a study looking at a broader range of fraudulent behavior.41)
These studies, however, rely on data that may have little bearing on current
practice because governance practices in the United States have considerably
less variation today than they did ten to twenty years ago. Virtually all of the
boards of American public companies are now "above average," at least when
compared with the governance practices of a generation ago.

3.

Reforming the Role of Independent Directors
The corporate governance reforms in the United States have not been

directed toward areas in which independent directors have been shown to
have a positive influence on shareholder returns. Instead, the reforms are
pinned to the hope that independent directors can encourage more accurate
financial reporting. That focus reflects the scandals that give rise to the
impetus for reform. The reforms came in response to a series of accounting
scandals at large public companies, most notably Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia
and Tyco. Unlike Korean crisis of

1997-1998,

the stock market decline that

accompanied these headlines of scandal did not have any appreciable effect
on the overall economy. Notwithstanding the limited economic impact of
these scandals, the widespread wrongdoing at those prominent firms raised
concerns that it might reflect a broader pattern of misleading financial
statements and self-dealing. Among the concerns raised were:

(1)

the

perception that managers focused too narrowly on showing earnings growth
from quarter to quarter, which may have created a temptation to shade the
numbers in order to show that growth; (2) the closely-related concern that
incentive-based compensation, which was supposed to align managers'
interests with those of shareholders, again may have tempted managers to
play fast-and-loose with accounting-based measures of performance; and

(3) a

limited form of self-dealing involving not related-party transactions of the sort
seen in the

chaebol,

but instead enormous pay packages to managers,

seemingly unchecked by too quiescent independent directors.

Financial S tatement Fraud, 71 THE Acer. REv. 443, 463 (1996).
41) Hatice Uzun et al., Board Composition and Corporate F raud, 60
(2004).

FIN. ANALYSfS

J. 33, 41
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Politicians quickly stepped in to exploit the opportunity created by this
very public airing of corporate dirty laundry. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
was the political response to the accounting crisis in the United States.42> Not
surprisingly, given that the impetus for legislation arose out of accounting
problems, the governance reforms adopted in response to the accounting
scandals revolve around the relation of public companies to their external
auditors. Those external auditors were perceived to be lacking in the
independence. A variety of restrictions were adopted to foster auditor
independence; the reform involving the board was to make the external
auditors solely accountable to independent directors.
Although anxious to be seen " doing something" about corporate
misbehavior, Congress took pains to avoid responsibility for the details of the
reforms to be adopted. Instead of requiring that audit committees be made up
solely of independent directors, Congress instead directed national securities
exchanges to adopt listing standards requiring wholly-independent audit
committees.43> The distinction between laws and listing standards is largely
cosmetic, given that changes in listing standards are subject to approval by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. In effect, the delegation of this task to
the exchanges was a

de facto

takeover of an important aspect of corporate

governance from state corporate law (its traditional domain in the American
system). The takeover was done, however, with a self-regulatory veneer,
useful because the exchanges have imposed governance standards, of varying
degrees of intrusiveness, for decades.44> Those listing standards now require
not only that all members of the audit committee be independent (as directed
by Congress), but also require that those members be "financially literate" or
possess "financial sophistication."45> Sarbanes-Oxley also requires that the
independent audit committee have exclusive authority over the retention and
compensation of auditors.46> Auditors also must report to the audit committee
material accounting decisions.47> Finally, the law establishes "whistle-

42) Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
43) Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204,§ 301, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
44) Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release No.
34-47654 (April 25, 2003).
45) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.07; Nasdaq Rule 4350(d)(2).
46) Sarbanes-Oxley Act,§ 301, supra note 43.
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blowing" procedures for employees to report concerns about accounting to
48
the audit committee. l
The requirement of the independent audit committee supplements the
requirement that the board of directors have a majority of independent
directors. Both the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq listing standards
49
now mandate that independent directors predominate. l In and of itself this
requirement is uncontroversial, but the definition of independence i s
circumscribed by a number o f relationships with the companies which are
50
specified as inconsistent with independence. l
A more direct challenge to the power of the CEO

is reflected in changes in

the selection of directors. Nomination of directors is placed in the hands of
independent directors: the NYSE requires a nominating committee consisting
solely of independent directors, while the Nasdaq allows a choice between
such a committee and nomination by a majority of the independent directors
51
serving on the board as a whole. l The exchanges split similarly on the
question of CEO compensation: the NYSE requires a compensation committee
consisting solely of independent directors, while the Nasdaq again gives a
choice between such a committee and allowing a majority of independent
52
directors to determine compensation. l The division between the NYSE and
Nasdaq reflects the difficulty that some smaller companies, largely con
centrated on the Nasdaq, may have in finding enough qualified independent
directors to serve all the mandated committees. The requirements relating to
CEO compensation probably codify, in large part, existing practice: CEO
compensation would be subject to entire fairness review by the courts if not
ratified by the independent directors.
All of these committee requirements have put substantial new
responsibilities on independent directors; compliance with all of these new
requirements has forced independent directors to work more. Not
surprisingly, companies have been forced to pay correspondingly more for

47) Id.,§ 204.
48) Id.,§ 301.
49) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.01; Nasdaq Rule 4350(c)(l).
50) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.02(a); Nasdaq Rule 4200(a)(15).
51) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.04(a); Nasdaq Rule 4350(c)(4)(a).
52) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.05(a); Nasdaq Rule 4350(c)(3)(a).
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independent directors' services.s3) The trend is unlikely to abate; the recent
subprime crisis has brought calls for a greater role by independent directors in
risk management.54) Given these greater responsibilities, boards may have to
expand to accommodate the greater work load. Expansion of the board,
however, may be bad news for investors, as larger boards correlate with
weaker firm performance ss)
.

Part 3: The Role of Independent Director in Korea and the

United States
1.

Korean and United States' Independent Directors Compared
The table below summarizes the recent reforms relating to independent

Korea

United States

Board

> 50% independenflil

>

Audit

Required

Required

Committee

67% outside directors and non

100% independent directors(J())

outside director member must

Must possess "financial

satisfy statutory independence
tesf8l

literacy"61)

Must have at least one finance
or accounting experf9)

50% independents?)

sophistication" or "financial

Auditors must report to audit
cornrnittee62)

53) Towers Perrin, Compensat ion for Corporate Directors Rose Modestly in 2008, available at
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/showdctmdoc.jsp?country=global&url=Master_Brand_2/U
SA/News/Monitor/2009/200910/mon_article_200910c.htm (reporting decline in director
compensation in 2008 after yearly increases of 10% ).
54) Press Release, National Association of Corporate Directors Launches Campaign to
Strengthen Corporate Governance ( Mar. 24, 2009), available at www.nac donline.org/
DirectorChallenge.
55) David Yerrnack, H igher Market Valuation ofCnmpanies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J.
FIN. ECON. 185, 209 (1996).
56) KOREAN COMMEROAL CODE, art. 542-8.
57) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.01; Nasdaq Rule 4350(c)(l).
58) KOREAN COMMEROAL CODE, art. 542-11 & 415-2.
59) Id., art. 542-11.
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Nominating
committee

Korea

United States

Required for outside directors
3
� 50% independent6 l

Required
100% independent directors on
committee or majority of
64
independent directors l

Compensation Not required

Required

committee

100% independent directors or
majority of independent
65
directors l

Related-party

66
Board approval required l

Independent directors' approval

transactions

Loans and guarantees prohibited

required (otherwise subject to
legal challenge )67)

(except for certain lirni ted

Cumulative
voting

circumstances)

Loans to officers prohibited68)

Required absent opt out in charter;
many firms have opted out69l

Permissible, but not required
and not common70l

directors for large, public firms in Korea and the United States discussed
above.
Placing the two countries reforms side-by-side in the chart highlights the
fact that Korea's corporate governance provisions, by and large, have more in
common with the requirements in the United States than differences. One
might conclude from this overall similarity, and given their relative states of
capital market development, that both countries have adopted roughly
appropriate models of corporate governance. I would argue, however, that
the opposite conclusion is warranted: given their relative states of capital

60) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.07(b); Nasdaq Rule 4350(d)(2).
61) Id.
62) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.07(a).
63) KOREAN COMMERGAL CODE, art. 542-8.
64) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.04(a); Nasdaq Rule 4350(c)(4)(a).
65) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.OS(a); Nasdaq Rule 4350(c)(3)(a).
66) KOREAN COMMERGAL CODE, art. 542-9.
67) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 307.00; DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 144; N. Y.
LAw§ 713; CAL. CoRP. CoDE§ 310.
68) Sarbanes-Oxley Act§ 402, supra note 43.
69) KOREAN COMMERGAL CODE, art. 542-7.
70) See MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr§ 7.28 comt. Statutory comparison (2008).

Bus. CoRP.
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market development, Korea requires more stringent corporate governance
mandates than does the United States. Korea cannot be content to follow the
American lead in corporate governance if it hopes to attain the depth and
liquidity of the American capital.

1.

The Path Forward for Independent Directors in Korea
Korea's public companies continue to be dominated by the

dominance is unlikely to end any time soon. As a result, the

chaebol; that
chaebol are the

face of Korean companies for many potential investors. As the research
discussed in Part

1

demonstrates minority shareholders in those

firms

face

very substantial risks of expropriation by the controlling shareholder. They
face an even more substantial risk that the

chaebol group will be managed

to

minimize the losses to the controlling shareholder. Potential investors have
good grounds to be wary of placing their money in the hands of the
controlling shareholders.
The combination of chaebol dominance and controlling shareholder abuses
means that the

chaebol

present a difficult

11

chicken-and-egg" problem for

Korean reformers. On the one hand, the available evidence suggests that the
shareholders of the

chaebol

companies would benefit the most from

improvements in corporate governance. Korea cannot encourage a culture of
investor confidence in Korean companies (with the attendant benefits that this
would create for economic growth) without taming the power of the
controlling shareholders of the
from their overreaching.

chaebol and protecting minority shareholders
Chaebol shareholders, as a group, would be better off

if governance were improved, but the benefits would accrue primarily to
minority shareholders at the expense of controlling shareholders. Thus,
controlling shareholders, anxious to preserve their substantial discretion, are
likely to pose a substantial obstacle to further reform. As a result of their
wealth and central role of their businesses in the Korean economy, the
controlling shareholders exercise tremendous influence in policy discussions.
Slicing this Gordian knot to promote a system that facilitates the confidence of
minority investors is the central challenge facing Korean regulators today.

Can the knot be cut? Unfortunately, the answer to this critical question is:
"Not overnight." Moreover, the task will take considerable political will . The
hope is that independent directors may be the camel's nose under the tent"
11
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that eventually brings true transparency and accountability in Korea's
corporate boardrooms. The power of independent directors will need to be
bolstered, however, to achieve this end. But any increase in the power of
independent directors is likely to draw opposition from the controlling
shareholders of the chaebol. To overcome that opposition, Korean reformers
must strategically take advantage of the periodic opportunities for reform created by financial crisis and scandal - to press for further power in the
hands of boards dominated by independent directors. Every incident in which
a controlling shareholder is publicly disgraced is an opportunity for further
reform.
The governance reforms already adopted in Korea are critical first steps.
Much reliance is placed, however, on independent directors to ensure that
these reforms translate into actual protection for minority shareholders. To
achieve this goal, independent directors need to be independent in more than
just name. At a minimum, independent directors need to be independent of
other members of the chaebol group, in addition to independent of the
company on whose board they serve. The current rule is that independent
directors cannot be employees of affiliated companies of the chaebol group.71l
They are not barred, however, from service as directors for chaebol affiliates.72l
Service as a director might not be thought to be sufficient to compromise
independence. The fees paid to directors are, after all, relatively modest when
compared to the typical directors' wealth and income. So one might perhaps
conclude that service as a director of an affiliated company should not be
deemed to compromise independence. On the other hand, directors owe a
duty to each of the companies on whose boards they serve, and in the chaebol,
these duties are likely to come into conflict.
The problem, however, may go deeper than a conflict of interest or legal
duty, either perceived or real. What is needed is a counter to controlling
shareholders' manipulation of transactions among the chaebol affiliated
companies. From this perspective, an independent director loyal to the group,
rather than the individual company, is not likely to help. The independent
director must be independent from the group in order to be fully independent

71) KOREAN COMMEROAL CODE, art. 382.
72) Id.
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from the controlling shareholder. To be sure, this will impose costs on group
cohesiveness, but that

is the point. If the controlling shareholder wants a free

hand to transfer assets among affiliated companies, the companies should be
merged, or the minority shareholders should be bought out and the structure
changed to a parent/ subsidiary one with

100%

ownership. Requiring

independent directors for all members of the group imposes a tax on an
interlocking corporate structure that has been shown to harm minority
shareholders. Controlling shareholders can avoid this tax by moving to a
holding company structure, which would carry with it substantially improved
transparency. 73)
Finding enough independent directors for all group companies will not be
easy. A more daunting challenge for reformers, however, is cultural rather
than legal. It will take time for Korea to develop a culture of independence
necessary for outside directors to have the desired effect on management. The
institution of independent directors

is starting from a very low level:

Korea has no tradition of active discussion within the Board of
Directors, and experience with independent directors has been limited.
Most have been lawyers, accountants, academics and retired govern
ment officials. Concerns have been expressed about the effective
independence of many independent directors and about their lack of
business experience. Newly-appointed directors often complain about
lack of access to the information they consider necessary for informed
decision-making.74)
This cultural weakness suggests that reformers must take stronger formal
steps to ensure that independent directors are tough-minded defenders of the
interests of all shareholders. It is worth considering whether the roles of CEO
and C hairman should be separated to provide a stronger voice for the
independent directors in the boardroom.
Another mechanism to bolster independent directors as monitors is to

73) Hwa-Jin Kirn, The Case for Market for Corporate Control in Korea, 8 J. KOREAN L. '22.7, 248
(2009) (discussing reorganization of SK Corporation in response to a hostile takeover attempt).
74) Bernard S. Black et al., Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing
International Competitiveness, 26 J. CORP. L. 537, 557 (2001).
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strengthen the role of institutional investors. The role of independent directors
could be greatly enhanced if shareholders were to take advantage of the
provision allowing shareholders holding at least one percent of the company's
shares to nominate candidates for director.75l Unfortunately, one weakness
currently limiting the effectiveness of institutional investors in Korean
corporate governance is that many Korean institutions are affiliated with the

chaebol

and as a result provide little in the way of independent monitoring.76l

One avenue for overcoming this problem is to encourage foreign institutions
to take larger positions in Korean companies. Such institutions are ac
customed to standards of corporate transparency substantially greater than
those currently practiced in most Korean companies. To be effective in
demanding transparency, however, these institutions will want some
assurance of representation in the boardroom. For this reason, restrictions on
share ownership for outside directors should be repealed.77J Ownership of
shares - if less than a controlling stake - is a powerful incentive to work
hard on behalf of minority shareholders. In addition, the provision of the
Korean Commercial Code [Sangbeop] allowing companies to remove
cumulative voting through their charter provision should be repealed.78l
Many companies have taken advantage of this position to eliminate the threat
posed to the controlling shareholder's power by institutional investors, thus
rendering the cumulative voting provision ineffective.79l There are now limits
on controlling shareholders voting their shares to remove cumulative voting.80l
These limits also apply to undoing the charter provisions that already restrict
cumulative voting.81l But who will initiate such a change? For outside
investors to have an effective voice in the direction of the company, cumulative
voting should be mandatory for the foreseeable future.
Cumulative voting would give institutions real clout in determining

who

75) KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 542-6.
76) Black et al., supra note 74, at 552.
77) KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 542-8; 5ANGBEOP 5IHAENGRYUNG (KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE], art. 13.
78) KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 382-2.
79) Bernard S. Black, The Role of Self-Regulation in S upporting Korea's Securities Markets, 3 J.
KOREAN L. 17, 27 n.9 (2003).
80) KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 542-7.
81) Id.
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the independent directors will be. Setting the agenda for voting is also
important. Although (as I discuss below) it is difficult to justify the inclusion of
any inside directors on the audit committee, the inclusion of inside directors
on the nominating committee raises a more problematic question. Including
inside directors on this committee may help ensure that the outside directors
chosen are a good "fit." But if insiders choose the outsiders, how closely will
the board scrutinize the conduct of the insiders? Here the conflict between the
board's role as a team decision-maker and its role as a monitor is particularly
acute. I think, however, that in the context of Korea's controlling shareholder
dominated corporate governance, the incremental independence that might
result is worth the loss in board solidarity. As transparency and accountability
increase, this question might need to be rethought.
The role of the audit committee also should be broadened and its
independence bolstered. The requirement that boards approve related-party
transactions over a certain size threshold is a step in the right direction. 82) The
dynamics of the board room, however, and the desire to get along with one's
fellow board members, make this provision less effective than is needed.
Given the pervasiveness of related-party transactions among chaebol members
and the evidence that such transactions are manipulated to benefit controlling
shareholders, stronger medicine is needed. Related-party transactions should
require approval of the company's audit committee, not the board. Moreover,
the audit committee should be made up exclusively of independent directors.
(Some firms have already taken an essentially equivalent step by creating
related party transaction review committees consisting exclusively of outside
directors.83) This approach may be preferable if there are concerns with
demanding too great a time commitment from outside directors.) The audit
committee, if properly empowered and staffed by the right people, is
potentially the single most effective mechanism for protecting the rights of
minority shareholders against overreaching by controlling shareholders and
managers. The internal auditor, as an employee of the firm, should report to
the audit committee, but should not be part of that committee, particularly if
the audit committee's responsibilities are expanded. Putting insiders in the

82) Id., art. 542-9.
83) Kirn, supra note 21, at 275.
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audit committee's meeting room, even if they meet statutory tests for
independence, can only dampen the vigorous independence that

is

needed

there. Giving the independent directors the separate space afforded by a
relatively autonomous audit committee may well encourage a certain
solidarity among them, and corresponding willingness to stand together to
make tough decisions in the face of demands from strong-willed controlling
shareholders. This monitoring role could be further enhanced by requiring
that the company pay the reasonable expenses of advisors - accountants,
lawyers, etc. - for the audit committee.84l

3.

Independent Directors in the United States: The Path Forward ?
If Korea would be well served by giving independent directors more

power, does it necessarily follow that the United States is equally well served?
The new independence requirements for boards that have been adopted in the
United States put the tension between the two roles of corporate boards in
stark contrast. One vision of the role of the board - call it the "cooperative"
model - sees independent directors as part of a team that helps devise
business strategy, offer the CEO and other managers useful advice based on
extensive business experience, and provides useful business contacts that help
promote the firm's profitability. The cooperative model sees outside directors
as useful because they broaden the range of expertise and experience available
to firm decision-making. The other vision of the role of the board - call it the
"adversarial" model - sees directors, particularly those independent of
management, as monitors of management, charged with uncovering self
dealing, fraud, other forms of malfeasance, and now, excessive risk taking.
The adversarial model sees outside directors as useful because they bring
vigilant suspicion to bear on management's activities. One suspects that the
vigilant "monitor"

is

not much of a "team" player. Moreover, one can have

doubts about who is benefiting from the monitoring. Is it the shareholders of
the firm, disabled by collective action problems from monitoring on their
own? Or is it the regulators, attempting to leverage their enforcement
resources by conscripting agents inside the firm to ensure that the corporation

84) Black et al., supra note 74, at 563.
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lives up to its social responsibilities? If shareholder voting does not suffice to
ensure that directors will monitor on behalf of shareholders in the way that
government regulators believe that they should, the theory goes, perhaps
other (more intrusive) mechanisms can help ensure that directors do their job.
The tension between the independent director's twin roles - advisor and
monitor - is inevitable. In the fervor of reform frenzy, it is easy to lose sight of
the important role that independent directors can play in making the business
more profitable. No one expects the board of directors to actively manage the
company, but the directors may have an important (non-monitoring) role to
play in developing an overall strategy and vision for the corporation. Despite
the emphasis that regulators put on the role of directors in ensuring the
corporation's managers comply with the law, independent directors typically
are chosen on the basis of their business expertise, not their monitoring
capabilities. So CEOs of other companies are several times more likely than
lawyers to serve on the boards of public companies.85l One assumes that it is
not because the CEOs are more vigilant monitors. The experience of top-level
management is apparently more valuable in devising business strategy than
the instruction provided in law school. Deputizing independent directors as
corporate cops inside the boardroom may have very real costs in the ability of
the board to help guide the business. The United States needs to worry about
how it may be undermining board effectiveness by fostering too much of an
adversarial relationship between independent directors and management;
Korea has far to go before this will be a concern.
These costs might be worth paying in the United States if enhanced
independence was likely to substantially reduce the incidence of fraud and
self-dealing, as it may do in Korea. But the United States is starting from a
much lower incidence of fraud and self-dealing than Korea (and most other
countries in which controlling shareholders dominate public companies).
Dispersed share ownership - and the corporate disclosure that promotes
such ownership - is the norm in the United States. There is a culture of
accountability by corporate managers to the market, as well as the board, that
serves as the background for policy efforts to discourage fraud and self
dealing. Fraud and greed will always be with us; closing off one avenue

85) Stephen P. Ferris et al., Too Busy To Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with
Multiple Board Appointments, 58 J. FIN. 1087, 1094 (2003).
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simply pushes the fraudsters and the greedy to find another weakness in the
system. The quest for regulatory perfection is illusory, but the costs of that
quest - which ultimately will be paid by the shareholders who are supposed
to benefit from regulation - will be all too real.

Part 4: Conclusion
My focus in this paper has been on the convergence between Korea and
the United States on the role of independent directors in corporate
governance. Korea has come a long way toward the United States model in
the last few years as it responded to a devastating financial crisis, even as the
United States raised the bar still higher in response to a corporate crisis of its
own. For this effort, Korean reformers are to be congratulated.
Unfortunately, there is still work to be done in Korea. The self-dealing and
lack of transparency of the

chaebol

are the principal impediments to a culture

of investor confidence in Korea. Independent directors - preferably selected
by institutional investors - can play an important role in making the changes
that are needed. To do so, however, their independence must be further
strengthened.
The United States, by contrast, now risks overdosing on independence.
Independence facilitates monitoring, but it discourages the trust and candor
that are essential to building an effective team. Independence, therefore,
should be deployed with caution, and not as the cure-all for the latest scandal
to catch the attention of politicians. Time will tell whether the United States

has used the appropriate caution in adopting its latest governance reforms.
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